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Abstract—Demand response (DR) programs have emerged as
a potential key enabling ingredient in the context of smart grid
(SG). Nevertheless, the rising concerns over privacy issues raised
by customers subscribed to these programs constitute a major
threat towards their effective deployment and utilization. This
has driven extensive research to resolve the hindrance confronted,
resulting in a number of methods being proposed for preserving
customers’ privacy. While these methods provide stringent pri-
vacy guarantees, only limited attention has been paid to their
computational efficiency and performance quality. Under the
paradigm of differential privacy, this paper initiates a systematic
empirical study on quantifying the trade-off between privacy and
optimality in centralized DR systems for maximizing cumulative
customer utility. Aiming to elucidate the factors governing this
trade-off, we analyze the cost of privacy in terms of the effect
incurred on the objective value of the DR optimization problem
when applying the employed privacy-preserving strategy based
on Laplace mechanism. The theoretical results derived from the
analysis are complemented with empirical findings, corroborated
extensively by simulations on a 4-bus MG system with up to
thousands of customers. By evaluating the impact of privacy, this
pilot study serves DR practitioners when considering the social
and economic implications of deploying privacy-preserving DR
programs in practice. Moreover, it stimulates further research on
exploring more efficient approaches with bounded performance
guarantees for optimizing energy procurement of MGs without
infringing the privacy of customers on demand side.
Index Terms—Demand response, differential privacy, micro-
grids, privacy preserving energy management, randomized re-
sponse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rising environmental and economic concerns necessitate
modernization of the aging power grid infrastructure into a
more sustainable and optimized cyber-physical system, SG.
Microgrids, reckoned as a vital contributor towards this tran-
sition, facilitate large scale deployment of renewable Dis-
tributed Generation (DG) and incorporation of new load types
such as plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). However,
the volatile nature of renewable energy sources along with
increasing customer expectation for both power quality and
quantity further complicate the energy management of MGs
besetting with an intricate power allocation problem critical
for maintaining system stability.
DR management has proven instrumental in resolving the
problem confronted, offering efficient schemes for energy
procurement and optimization of MGs suffering from power
disbalance [1]. To achieve the desired system reliability, re-
silience and power quality, DR programs aim at establishing a
mutually beneficial interaction framework for DR participants
and aggregators where power generation drives the demand.
With DR, customers are incentivized to shape and sched-
ule their consumption profiles to flatten the peak demand,
consequently deferring the cost of generation expansion and
ancillary grid services. Among other advantages, DR enables
reduced price variations [2], enhanced congestion management
[3] and strengthened system security [4]. DR programs can be
broadly categorized into two classes, price-based and event-
based [5]. Event-based DR programs are efficient especially
during the times when there is insufficient supply of power on
MG side to meet the available demand [5], [6].
Increasing customer participation translates into elevated
benefits for DR operators, as the availability and volume of
controllable load reserves grows with the number of DR partic-
ipant devices. To this end, customers’ concerns over privacy
could constitute a major threat [7], [8]. DR programs with
centralized control architecture, which are commonly deployed
in practice [9], [10], entail information pertaining to customer
loads and preferences as the inputs for optimization. This may
limit customer participation severely since customers may not
be willing to reveal such information out of confidentiality
reasons [11]. Possessing knowledge on the desired power val-
uation (utility) and electricity consumption characteristics of a
customer empowers DR operators or potential eavesdroppers
to exploit this marketable information to their own benefit.
According to [12], information on power consumption alone
suffices to infer customer’s appliances operated or even daily
activities. More importantly, with this information an adver-
sary participant may attempt to manipulate the DR outcome
by misreporting own utility value for the sake of profit.
It is widely acknowledged that ad-hoc approaches such as
anonymizing customer data are devoid of privacy features
owing to the availability of public side information [13].
Alternatively, it might be tempting to retain privacy in DR
with a distributed control scheme in place, where response
decisions are computed on a customer’s end involving ex-
change of surrogate information only. In [14] a distributed
energy management strategy is proposed with the objective
of maximizing aggregate utilities of the appliances in the
households and minimizing power losses. However, distributed
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DR programs typically suffer from synchronization problems
and could incur diminished system-wide controllability and
efficiency, in contrast to the centralized ones [9]. Besides, it
is suspected that, in general, inferring the private customer
information concealed implicitly in the exchanged surrogate
coordination signals could be still viable. In the view of the
above arguments, deriving efficient privacy-aware strategies
for solving large-scale DR problems under centralized control
philosophy becomes vital.
While ensuring customer privacy, DR operators should also
seek to achieve certain benefits determined by the objective
function of DR optimization problem. As long as the private
information lies in the objective function or constraint matrix
of the DR problem these two objectives are conflicting.
Indeed, optimizing the DR management choosing to ignore
customer input data as a privacy-preventive measure may lead
to arbitrarily worse solutions when compared to the optimal
solution. The induced suboptimality gap typifies the cost of
privacy, in a sense to be formalized in Section IV. Most of
the extant literature on energy management of MGs, such as
[11], [15], [16] and [17]–[19], approach this trade-off from one
angle or the other leaving the privacy cost largely unexamined.
Among these works, those dealing with the privacy aspect
advocate approaches relying on cryptographic techniques and
security protocols that may evoke substantial communication
and computation overhead, thereby questioning their practical-
ity in large-scale applications.
Recently, smart metering infrastructure sparked consider-
able research efforts [20]–[23] in response to privacy threats.
Various schemes have been developed for securing the smart
meter data aggregation and customer demand reporting in
SG. However, the setting in these studies envisions smart
metering primarily in the scope of electricity billing service
rather than deployed within a DR optimization model as
in the case studied here. A simple yet effective privacy
solutions are presented in [24], [25] for demand reporting
by utilizing rechargeable batteries. Essentially, the batteries
are used as a proxy between smart metering devices and
household appliances to mask consumer demands in a non-
intrusive manner. This is desirable as it maintains consumer
privacy without introducing additional noise while satisfying
smart grid constraints.
Against this background, the focus here is to explore the
interplay between privacy and optimality in centralized event-
based DR management programs through extensive empirical
analysis. In addition to this, the gap between suboptimal
private and optimal non-private solutions is bounded theoret-
ically. We further unravel the obscure relationship between
privacy and DR parameters driving this trade-off, thus con-
ducing to deeper understanding of the scales and dynamics
of privacy phenomena in event-based energy management for
MGs.
As to other related literature, studies in [26], [27] cov-
ered a more thorough investigation of the privacy cost. An
efficient privacy-assuring metering scheme is proposed in
[26]. Customer’s privacy is achieved by adding a randomly
generated number to the measurement sent from the smart
meter to the power provider, making it a simple and low
complexity approach. The trade-off between economic benefit
and privacy is evaluated in terms of the error in the billed
amount to SG operator. Compared to [26], this paper provides
a deeper insight of the privacy effect on MG performance
when evaluating it within a comprehensive DR optimization
framework with an accurate realistic MG model and privacy
levels adaptable to customer preferences. Privacy preservation
is also evident in economic load dispatch control problem
for minimizing generation cost [27]. Customer demands are
altered by noise prior to reaching the control unit to enable
the privacy. The increased generation cost attributed to privacy
is assessed through small scale experiments based on a 5-bus
power system with 200 customers only and a simplified grid
model that omits AC power flow equations.
Typically, in a DR management scheme, there is a single
load-serving entity (LSE) or an operator of MG, who co-
ordinates the decisions of DR participants. There is a high
probability that an MG once initiated will be short of power,
consequently resulting in significant voltage and frequency
deviations, and leading to its instability. The LSE then invokes
the featured event-based DR program to ensure the endurance
of an MG by balancing out power generation and demand.
Constrained by the net available apparent generation and
power flow equations, LSE is required to make control de-
cisions in real time as to maximize the total utility of satisfied
customers without violating their privacy. To attain this in a
scalable fashion, an efficient privacy-preserving mechanism
introduced in [28] is leveraged to this end, which also provides
a definite theoretical guarantee on the level of privacy and
optimality. The privacy cost is quantified by benchmarking
the maximized utility of this mechanism with that in the
omniscient case, where customer privacy is not protected.
The major contribution of this preliminary study is centered
on two salient features that differentiate it from the surveyed
literature. First, particular emphasis is paid to establishing
a realistic DR system with an accurate and reliable MG
model capturing power flow and operational constraints (e.g.,
Kirchhoffs law, voltage bounds, reactive power) associated
with the underlying distribution network. The importance and
necessity of this were acknowledged in [29]–[31], which high-
light that using a simplified MG model may lead to infeasible
load management decisions in practice and thus impairs the
credibility of the results produced. Second, power valuation,
which is a core design parameter of an event-based DR, is
regarded as information private to an individual customer only.
While various approaches were proposed for tackling privacy
in demand reporting (e.g., the method in [24], [25] relying
on rechargeable batteries), the setting with private power
valuations has not been studied properly. Taken together,
these contributions illustrate and appraise the ramifications of
deploying event-based DR programs in practice where privacy
concerns are a priority.
As one demonstration, the proposed privacy-preserving DR
scheme is applied to a 4-bus feeder from Canadian distribution
system (see Fig. 1 in Section III). The results indicate that
incorporating privacy in centralized event-based DR man-
agement may degrade the optimality of the produced load
management decisions severely. Nevertheless, considering a
realistic scenario with heterogeneous privacy levels varying
among customers may smooth the impact of privacy. Also, it
is inferred that the privacy cost is influenced by several DR
parameters including customer type, number of customers and
privacy level.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section briefly scopes preliminaries of the adopted
privacy notion.
A. Differential Privacy
When it comes to quantifying the extent of privacy of a
customer participating in DR program, this paper adheres to
the notion of differential privacy. Originated from the research
in [32] and defined by [33], differential privacy has evolved as
a rigorous definition of privacy in computer science. As such,
it can be interpreted as a guarantee that altering an individual
record in the input set does not impact the distribution of the
computation outcomes significantly. In other terms, customers’
private information becomes indistinguishable in the output of
a differentially private algorithm. This yields a strong privacy
guarantee regardless of any auxiliary information the adversary
may possess.
On the other hand, it is increasingly hard to derive efficient
algorithms meeting such a stringent privacy guarantee [28]. As
a consequence, many fundamental problems as those studied
in [34], [35] have private solutions, while lacking efficient
algorithms. For a certain class of combinatorial optimization
problems several approximation algorithms are devised in
[36] that retain differential privacy. Laplace mechanism and
exponential mechanism, which by far are the most prevalent
approaches practiced for differential privacy were introduced
in [33] and [37], respectively. Unlike the former one, exponen-
tial mechanism runs in linear time of its output range, which
might largely outweigh the number of customers, and thus is
not suitable for the purposes of this study.
The framework of differential privacy represents informa-
tion private to a customer as a set D referred to as database.
Let D be the domain of all databases of interest. The basic idea
underlying this framework is to draw an association between
privacy and impact of an individual customer in the database.
The impact, that is, changes that occur in the database when
altering or deleting a customer’s record is characterized by the
concept of neighboring databases. Define databases D ∈ D
and D′ ∈ D to be neighboring if they are identical except
a single record. Differential privacy is formalized by the
definition below.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy [33]). A randomized algo-
rithm A : D → Rn that maps databases to an output range R
is (, δ)-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring
databases D ∈ D, D′ ∈ D and ∀ S ⊆ R
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ , (1)
where  > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1).
Similarly, an algorithm A is called -differentially private,
if δ = 0. The level of privacy is characterized by the constant
. The smaller the  the higher is privacy level.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Towards defining the proposed DR optimization problem
formally, this section starts by modeling the system and its
components. The adopted DR model envisions a single LSE
procuring the responses of customers’ demands over a decision
horizon T , {1, ...,m}. The decision horizon T is discretized
into m equal periods with a duration corresponding to the
required time resolution granularity at which DR management
decisions are to be produced. At each time slot t ∈ T , the net
available generation capacity of MG is denoted by Ct ∈ R+.
A. Load Model
Consider a set of customers N , {1, ..., n} for a DR
management scheme run by LSE. A customer k ∈ N is
associated with a complex-valued power demand Sk ∈ C
required for operating certain electric appliances at particular
time instant. Denote by SRk , Re(Sk) the active power
demand of customer k, and by SIk , Im(Sk) the reactive
power demand. For clarity of presentation, this paper assumes
(via a rotation of power demand vectors) that SRk ≥ 0 and
SIk ≥ 0 for ∀k ∈ N .
To allow effective DR application, diverse customer appli-
ances should be taken into account. The customers’ demands
here are categorized into two types according to their operation
and energy consumption characteristics, elastic (divisible) and
inelastic (indivisible). The demand of a customer possessing
inelastic load can be either shed or fed completely. This
models the electric appliances that can operate only under
particular energy supply level (e.g., washing machine, vacuum
cleaner). Different from the inelastic demands, an elastic load
may be satisfied partially and adjusted to operate with different
energy consumption levels (e.g., air conditioner, LED light).
B. Modeling the Distribution Network
To incorporate the power flow and voltage constraints into
the DR optimization problem a model of the distribution
network, resembling that of in [38], is established below. We
shall confine our attention to radial (tree) distribution networks
which are common in practice [39].
The distribution system is represented by a graph G =
(V, E), where each customer k ∈ N is located at a given
node except the root. The set of nodes V denote the electric
buses, whereas the set of edges E denote the distribution lines.
The nodes in V are indexed by {0, 1, ..., |V|}, where the node
0 denotes the generation source of MG. Let Vi ∈ C denote
the voltage of node i ∈ V . Define Ii,j to be the current
flowing through edge e = (i, j) ∈ E and with a slight abuse
of notation, Ŝi,j ∈ C to be the transmitted power through that
edge. Similarly, let zi,j ∈ C be the impedance of that edge.
Denote by vi , |Vi|2 and `i,j , |Ii,j |2 the magnitude square
of voltage and current, respectively. For each node i ∈ V\{0},
there is a set of customers attached to i, denoted by Mi.
A power flow in a steady state can be characterized by a
set of power flow equations. In radial networks (which include
paths) the Branch Flow Model (BFM) proposed by [40] can
be used to model them. Assuming v0 is given, the BFM is
captured by the following set of equations for ∀ (i, j) ∈ E
`i,j =
|Ŝi,j |2
vi
, (2)
vj = vi + |zi,j |2`i,j − 2Re(z∗i,jŜi,j), (3)
Ŝi,j =
∑
l:(j,l)∈E
Ŝj,l +
∑
k∈Mj
Skxk + zi,j`i,j , (4)
where xk is the load management decision produced by LSE
for customer k ∈ N , Re(ψ) denotes the real component
of a complex number ψ ∈ C and ψ∗ denotes the complex
conjugate of ψ. Decision variable xk takes values either from
[0, 1] or {0, 1} for elastic and inelastic demands, respectively.
Equations (2) - (4), essentially, capture Ohm’s law combined
with the Kirchhoffs laws of electric flows and power flow
definitions.
Furthermore, for each node i ∈ V \ {0} the following
operational constrain should be satisfied
vmin ≤ vi ≤ vmax , (5)
where vmin, vmax ∈ R+ are the minimum and maximum
allowable voltage magnitude square at any node, respectively.
The setting studied here assumes a limited apparent power
generation on MG and thus at each time step t ∈ T
|Ŝ0,1| ≤ Ct . (6)
Observe that BFM model is non-convex due to the quadratic
equality constraints in Eqn.(2) and thus is computationally
intractable in general. We therefore consider relaxing them
to inequalities in Eqn. (7) to convexify the model. Due to
the same reason, this relaxation is adopted in [29], [30],
[41]. Obviously, when the equality in (7) is attained then the
relaxation is exact. In fact, it was shown in [42] that this
relaxation happens to be exact under certain mild conditions
in most of the practical radial distribution systems including
IEEE bus systems.
`i,j ≥ |Ŝi,j |
2
vi
, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (7)
Lastly, it is assumed that the MG system encompasses a hybrid
mix of traditional and renewable energy (RE) supplies that
could collectively have a variable (depending on the avail-
ability of RE and storage available) yet dispatchable capacity.
In the sequel, using the established distribution model, the
employed differentially private mechanism of [28] is applied
to a 4-bus feeder of the Canadian benchmark system depicted
in Fig. 1.
4 MVA 
Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4
2 MVA Load 2 MVA Load 2 MVA Load 2 MVA Load
Fig. 1: A 4-bus feeder from Canadian benchmark distribution
system.
C. Customer Preference Model
In a DR program where each subscribed customer is an
independent decision maker, typically, the response to the
incentives by the DR aggregator is modeled by an utility
function. The response may vary depending on the particular
time of a day (e.g. at peak and non-peak hours). Moreover, it
may vary from customer to customer based on the consump-
tion profile (i.e., when considering residential and commercial
customers).
To simplify the exposition, the utility function is sum-
marized by an utility value (power valuation) utk associated
with a customer k ∈ N . This value quantifies the extent
of satisfaction obtained (or alternatively, the payment) by
customer k when own power demand is satisfied at time t ∈ T .
In the case with inelastic demands, if Sk is satisfied at time
slot t, utk is the perceived utility for customer k, otherwise
zero utility is perceived. As for a customer k′ ∈ N with an
elastic load, a portion b ∈ [0, 1] of the power demand Sk′
drawn from MG at time instant t imparts an utility of b · utk′ .
D. Privacy-Preserving DR
Recall that the DR scheme under study requires protecting
customer sensitive information in the input data. In partic-
ular, this paper focuses on the case where utilities, which
define the objective function of DR optimization problem,
are the sensitive information to customers. In more detail,
the private database at time t of the participating customers
is D = {utk}k∈N . Since only aggregate power demands are
required by LSE, it is assumed that the customer loads can be
protected in a non-intrusive manner by a method akin to those
proposed in [24], [25] relying on rechargeable batteries. In a
sense, shifting between neighboring databases affects only the
objective function of the DR problem leaving the constraint
matrix unchanged.
In the envisioned DR program featuring a centralized con-
trol scheme, each customer declares his reactive and active
power demand through the equipped smart metering infras-
tructure to LSE upon request. In order to prevent customer
utilities from being exposed to LSE or a potential eavesdropper
the adopted strategy produces a perturbed utility value to
obfuscate customer’s true valuation. Section IV scopes a
detailed explanation of this mechanism and provides provable
guarantees on its privacy level.
It is worthy to note, that this scheme is general enough
to handle customers with multiple utilities (independent of
each other) for corresponding subsets of own demands. This
allows customers to prioritize their demands based on the
importance and value without altering the proposed problem
formulation. To effectively control DR management, low-
latency communication infrastructure between the LSE and
customers using separate power supply will be utilized in the
proposed scheme. Such an infrastructure is enabled by the
standards of SG communication protocols [43]. Additionally,
it is to be assumed that LSE has full control over the on/off
or adjusting operations of its customers’ demands.
As mentioned previously, devising computationally efficient
algorithms in differential privacy with provable optimality
guarantees is substantially difficult. In fact, it was shown
in [28] that if one makes no assumptions on the sensitivity
of the private data it is impossible to devise such an algorithm
with non-trivial optimality guarantees. This necessitates the
need for introducing the simplifying assumption stated here-
under that will be followed throughout this paper.
Assumption 1. There exist positive umax and umin known to
LSE apriori such that for ∀ k ∈ N , umin ≤ utk ≤ umax ∀t ∈
T .
We remark that Assumption 1 naturally holds in DR sys-
tems, since usually umin and umax are determined by LSE.
The subsequent section defines the DR optimization problem
and formalizes the privacy cost.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND CHOSEN APPROACH
A. Optimization Problem
Now that the system model is established, the utility maxi-
mizing demand response problem (UMDR) at time t ∈ T can
be formulated in an optimal power flow framework by the fol-
lowing quadratically constrained mixed integer programming
(QCMIP) problem.
(UMDR) max
xk,vi,`i,j ,Ŝi,j
∑
k∈N
utkxk
subject to (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) (8)
xk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ k ∈ N (9)
Here, xk is a binary decision variable that takes value 1 if
and only if the k-th customer’s power demand Sk is satisfied
and 0 otherwise. The UMDR problem aims at maximizing the
overall net utility of customers while maintaining the apparent
power generation Ct bound at time instant t ∈ T , power flow
equations and voltage levels.
Evidently, UMDR is NP-HARD, since the 0-1 classical
knapsack problem is its special case. Relaxing binary (discrete)
decision variables (xk) to continuous ones in UMDR problem,
such that xk ∈ [0, 1], yields a convex quadratic programming
problem denoted by UMDRL. This seemingly small change
in problem formulation, in fact, alters the complexity of DR
optimization problem notably, since the convex variant can be
solved optimally in polynomial time (e.g., by applying Interior
Point methods). Aside from complexity, setting the decision
variable (xk) to be discrete or continuous alters the practical
aspects of DR application. Concretely, the continuous case
corresponds to customers having only elastic power demands.
As for the case with binary decision variables, DR participant
demands comprising the customer set are solely inelastic loads.
B. Differentially Private Method
This subsection presents an efficient randomized mecha-
nism, introduced by [28], to compute solutions of UMDR
and UMDRL problems privately. The method relies on a
principle differential privacy technique which is explained in
what follows.
Define a function f : D → Rn to be 4-sensitive
if ||f(D) − f(D′)||1 ≤ 4 for ∀ neighboring D,D′ ∈ D.
Let Lap(Ω) denote the Laplace transformation of Ω with
a probability density function f(x | Ω) = 12Ωe−
|x|
Ω . Then,
applying the Laplace mechanism to a 4-sensitive function
f(D) yields f(D)+[µ1, µ2, ..., µn]T , where µ1, µ2, ..., µn are
n independent and identically distributed draws from Lap(4 )
with  > 0.
Theorem 1 ( [44]). A randomized algorithm A that invokes
the Laplace mechanism explained above is -differentially
private.
Instead of releasing the true customer valuations, the consid-
ered mechanism perturbs each customer’s utility utk indepen-
dently by adding a noise drawn from the Laplace distribution
that commensurates with the desired level of privacy. Define
uˆtk , utk + Lap(
(umax−umin)
√
8n log( 1δ )
 ) to be the perturbed
utility of customer k ∈ N at time t ∈ T . Then the private
analog of UMDRL problem (DR with elastic demands) is
embodied by the following convex programming problem.
(UMPDR)L max
xk,vi,`i,j ,Ŝi,j
∑
k∈N
utkxk
subject to (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) (10)
xk ∈ [0, 1], ∀ k ∈ N (11)
Solving UMPDRL problem non-privately results in a private
solution to the original one. Note that any feasible solution to
UMPDRL is also feasible for UMDRL. Denote by X∗L ⊆ N
an optimal solution of UMDRL and by OPTL ,
∑
k∈X∗L u
t
k
the corresponding total utility for any time t ∈ T . Set Xˆ∗L ⊆ N
to be an optimal solution of UMPDRL and define OPTDPL ,∑
k∈Xˆ∗L u
t
k.
Theorem 2 ( [28]). An optimal solution Xˆ∗L for UMPDRL
problem is (, δ)-differentially private feasible solution to
UMDRL that with high probability satisfies the following
additive optimality bound OPTDPL ≥ OPTL − α where α =
4(umax−umin)
√
8n log(nδ )
 .
The proof of Theorem 2 can be consulted in [28].
The privacy cost in this study is defined in terms of the
relative difference between OPTL and OPTDPL . In a sense,
it exemplifies the diminished objective value arising as a
result of solving the DR optimization problem with inaccurate
customers demands obfuscated by differentially private noise.
For UMDRL, the cost of privacy, denoted by ΦL ∈ [0, 1], is
defined as
ΦL ,
OPTL − OPTDPL
OPTL
. (12)
When ΦL = 0, this represents the ideal desirable case when
no cost is incurred on the optimality of the produced energy
management decisions. The closer ΦL to 1 the higher the
privacy cost is and so is the optimality gap. For example,
ΦL = 0.4 implies that incorporating the privacy-preserving
method entails 40% loss of optimality. Following the logic of
Eqn. (12), define Φ to be the privacy cost for UMDR problem.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
To complement the analytic result in Theorem 2, this section
evaluates the utilized differentially private mechanism empiri-
cally by applying it to a simulated 4-bus feeder from Canadian
benchmark distribution system, which appears in Fig.1. The
objective is to investigate and quantify the privacy cost in the
proposed event-based DR system. The CPLEX optimizer is
utilized to obtain the close-to-optimal solutions numerically
for UMDR, UMDRL problems and their differentially private
analogs.
A. Simulation Setup and Settings
The feeder, which is rated at 8.7MVA, 400A and 12.47KV,
is simulated with an overall generation capacity of 4MVA and
over 1500 customers allocated among the nodes. Each feeder
section is a 700MCM Cu XLPE cable with impedance z =
0.1529+J0.1406 Ω/km. Each customer has a specific power
demand (including both active and reactive power) and a utility
that is generated according to a probability preference model.
Due to limited power supply, the customers may suffer from
a reduction of generation capacity occasionally. Various types
of loads are considered including residential and commercial
customers. Typically, the load power factor varies between 0.8
to 1 (to comply with IEEE standards) and thus the maximum
phase angle between any pair of demands is restricted to be
in the range of [0, 36◦].
B. Case Studies
Various case studies are performed to evaluate the studied
privacy-preserving mechanism considering diverse scenarios
with respect to the correlation between customer loads and
utilities, consumption profile and privacy levels. The following
are settings for the case studies in this paper.
(i) Utility-demand correlation:
a) Quadratic utility (Q): The utility of a customer is a
quadratic function of the power demand in the form
of utk(|Sk|) = a · |Sk|2 + b · |Sk| + c , ∀t ∈ T ,
where a > 0, b, c ≥ 0 are predetermined constants.
b) Uncorrelated setting (U): The utility of each cus-
tomer is independent of the power demand and
is generated randomly from [0, |Smax(k)|], where
|Smax(k)| depends on the customer type.
(ii) Customer types:
a) Residential (R) customers: The customer set is com-
prised of residential customers having small power
demands ranging from 1500VA to 15KVA.
b) Mixed (M) customers: The customer set is comprised
of a mix of commercial and residential customers.
Commercial customers have big power demands
ranging from 300KVA up to 1MVA and constitute
no more than 10% of all customers chosen at
random.
(ii) Privacy levels:
a) Fixed (F) privacy level: Customers are assigned only a
single homogeneous level of privacy predetermined
by LSE.
b) Variable (V) privacy level: Customers are allowed to
choose the desired privacy protection level from a
predefined set offered by LSE.
In this paper, the case studies will be represented by the
aforementioned acronyms. For example, the case study named
QMV stands for the one with mixed customers, quadratic
utility-demand correlation and heterogeneous privacy levels.
C. Simulations with Homogeneous Privacy Levels
In this subsection the privacy cost is evaluated for case stud-
ies with homogeneous privacy levels, where each case study is
analyzed considering changes in the set of customers. For each
DR optimization problem (i.e., UMDR and UMDRL), two
different privacy levels are examined where the corresponding
value of  is set to 0.01 and 1. As for additive privacy
parameter δ, the value is fixed to 0.5 for all case studies.
The privacy cost for UMDR is compared for different
values of  in Fig.2. The employed privacy method with an
input parameter of is applied to the UMDR problem (i.e.,
this corresponds to solving UMPDR with perturbed customer
utilities calculated accordingly) 30 times for each of the m
number of customers, where m varies between 500 to 1500 in
steps of hundred. For case studies with residential customers,
m varies between 1000 to 1500 since with fewer customers
the total load on MG is less than the supply thus resulting
in trivial DR decisions. Each of 30 iterations yields random
changes in demands and utilities of customers.
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Fig. 2: The average privacy cost for UMDRL against the
number of customers at 95% confidence interval.
The privacy cost for UMDR is contrasted with that of
UMDRL in Fig. 3 considering a fixed number of customers.
Here, the privacy level  is varied from 5 · 10−5 to 1 for
900 customers considering random changes in demands and
utilities.
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Fig. 3: The average privacy cost for UMDR and UMDRL
against  at 95% confidence interval.
One of the important findings observed is a common trend
appearing in all the case studies performed. As can be inferred
from Figures 2 and 3 increasing  reduces the optimality
gap and hence the privacy cost. In other terms, the higher
the privacy requirements the higher the privacy cost. This
directly implies that the privacy cost increases with the noise
magnitude since the Laplace noise added to each customer’s
utility increases when lowering . As illustrated in Fig. 2,
on a MG with 500 customers the studied privacy preserving
mechanism resulted in a privacy cost of 0.59 when  = 1 (i.e.,
the optimality of DR is decreased by 59%), whereas when
 = 0.1 the privacy cost is about 0.63, considering the case
study QMF.
Another important observation is that with increasing cus-
tomer participation optimality of produced DR solutions de-
grades drastically. As depicted in Fig. 2, when the number of
customers is small the privacy cost is only in order of 0.6
when considering case study QMF, while as the customer set
cardinality grows privacy cost proliferates approaching nearly
1. This highlights the necessity of devising efficient privacy
preserving mechanisms, with a constant factor guarantee on
the optimality gap, capable of solving large-scale DR man-
agement problems.
Also, it is observed that the privacy cost is sensitive to
different customer types. In particular, the privacy cost grows
slower for case studies with residential customers than in those
with mixed industrial and residential customers. As indicated
in Fig. 2, the difference in privacy cost for case study QRF
is about 0.08 when considering the number of customers
ranging from 1000 to 1500. In contrast, for the same range
the privacy increases nearly by 1.2 in case study QMF. In a
sense, incorporation of privacy has more significant degrading
effect on the optimality for the scenarios with mixed customers
as compared to those with only residential customers.
D. Dynamic Generation Capacity and Heterogeneous Privacy
Levels
The previous set of experiments considered an MG with
a fixed generation capacity and homogeneous privacy levels.
Here simulations are performed considering the case when the
MGs generation capacity is varying over time, which could
be representative of a case of hybrid system with renewable
DG sources. Furthermore, in a real-world situation customers
may desire different levels of privacy depending on their
preferences. Thus, the simulation studies performed in this
section consider heterogeneous privacy levels.
The time-varying generation capacity of MG that follows a
Bernoulli process is dynamically varied between 1MVA and
4MVA from time 0 to 10000 (seconds). To analyze the effect
of heterogeneous privacy levels, the employed mechanism
is applied to the feeder with 1000 customers. The observed
privacy cost is plotted in Fig 4.
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Fig. 4: The average privacy cost against the number of
customers at 95% confidence interval considering dynamic
generation capacity.
The privacy cost and absolute noise magnitude (per cus-
tomer), which appear in Fig. 5, are evaluated considering
changes in the number of customers, whereas MG generation
capacity remains fixed.
The results demonstrate that allowing flexible privacy levels,
instead of flat ones, may considerably increase the optimality
of the proposed DR management scheme. The average privacy
cost plotted in Fig. 5 for case study QMV fluctuates around
0.4 while the number of customers changes and does not drift
far away from that threshold. Whereas, in the scenarios with
homogeneous privacy levels appearing in Fig. 2 the privacy
cost was sometimes as high as nearly 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the trade-off between privacy and op-
timality in centralized DR management of MGs. Under the
framework of differential privacy, the privacy cost is quantified
empirically through extensive numerical simulations on a
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Fig. 5: The average privacy cost as a function of the number
of customers at 95% confidence interval.
realistic distribution network. The observed results illustrate
the striking effect posed on the optimality of produced solu-
tions to DR optimization problem when considering increased
privacy guarantees. According to the findings, the optimality
gap approaches nearly 90% in some cases, which urges the
need for efficient privacy preserving algorithms with constant
theoretical guarantees on the worst case performance. The
major factors identified in this study that define this trade-
off are the number of customers, privacy level and customer
type.
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